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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case is about a mistake of fact made by a hunter, who was doing his best to keep the law, 
despite its complexity. But how can one keep the law when the law is unclear or in this case 
unknown? "Everyone knows 'ignorance of the law is no excuse,'" stated the prosecutor to the 
jury. "\Ve are all expected to know and keep the law!" Does this mean that citizens should 
faithfully study all of Idaho's statutes and rules in order to know and keep the law? Maybe it 
would be wise for all Idahoans to own a copy ofIdaho's Criminal Code book and faithfully 
study it along with all IDAP A rules. 
In a country whose laws are based on Judeo-Christian beliefs, some things are understood. Thou 
shall not steal. Thou shall not murder. Thou shall not lie. But should a hunter be expected to 
know that elk hunting is allowed in only one selected zone in 2010, when the tradition of law for 
decades has allowed hunters to hunt wherever there was an open season? Clearly hunters cannot 
be expected to research Idaho code to know the law. That is why the legislature requires 
whenever there is a rule change it be published [clearly] in an official proclamation of the 
agency's rules. The Idaho Fish and Game is required by law to clearly notify the public of any 
rule changes in its official proclamation known as the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules" 
and then distribute it liberally and free. In matter of fact, most hunters rely exclusively on this 
publication to understand the law. It is then logical that if there is a rule of consequence not only 
will it be "in" the brochure, but it will be crystal clear. The magistrate ruled and the district court 
affirmed that whether the proclamation clearly notified the hunters or not was a matter of law. In 
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this they were in error. Whether the law requires the hunters be properly notified in an official 
proclamation or not is a matter of law; whether the brochure did that is a matter of fact and 
should have been a question for the jury. 
But the case goes much deeper than whether the proclamation gave sufficient notice to the 
appellant; the case puts on trial the perverted doctrine of "general intent and malum prohibitum 
crimes." For decades agencies like the Idaho Fish and Game have turned minor regulatory 
violations into full blown crimes, while still retaining the low burden of proof that only requires 
the commission of an act. They have through crafty prosecutors and unwise justices eliminated 
the element of criminal intent or criminal negligence, even though by law it is a required element 
in "every" crime. Furthermore, this case exposes the widely and wrongly accepted doctrine that 
"ignorance and/or mistake of fact of the law is no excuse." It is an excuse and can be found in 
Idaho law! 
This case is a glaring indictment of the corruption of the criminal justice system in Idaho and the 
abuse of power by agencies like the Idaho Fish and Game. It puts on full display the meaning of 
a "Kangaroo" court. Unbelievably, the Defendant was precluded by "Order" from bringing forth 
any evidence that would acquit him. The only statement he was allowed to make was, yes, he 
killed a cow elk in the Tex Creek Zone; an admission he had made publicly and honestly on day 
1. If that was the entire defense the Defendant was allowed to make, why even have a trial? In 
fact, the State argued a trial was not necessary; the Defendant had already admitted to the crime 
and all the crime required was the commission of an illegal act. However, the magistrate, feeling 
some semblance of due process was needed, held a trial, if it could be called that. After all, the 
hypocrisy of Idaho's criminal justice system does have its limits. 
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Finally, if being silenced wasn't enough, the prosecutor corruptly displayed a "made-up" tag that 
was entered into evidence, given to the jury, and then covered up as if it had never been admitted 
by the Court Clerk. How much more corruption could possibly exist in one case? And for the 
Defendant's vehement protest against the corruption, the court gave the defendant five days in 
jail and a Contempt of Court misdemeanor for handing out a paper explaining to jurors their right 
to vote their conscience. If ever there was a case of injustice it now sits before Idaho State 
Supreme Court. God give Idaho's highest court the wisdom to see this. 
Course and Proceedings Below 
On December 7, 2010, a Criminal Complaint was filed charging Mr. Rammell with Possession 
of Game Unlawfully Taken, a misdemeanor, pursuant to Idaho Code 36-502(b). 
On April 14, 2011, the State filed a Motion in Limine, which would preclude the Defendant from 
attempting to admit any evidence of his intent. The State argued the "crime charged is a general 
intent crime and does not require any specific intent. 
On April 20, 2011, the magistrate "ordered that there shall be no evidence presented by 
defendant concerning his intent or lack of intent to violate the law or his knowledge or lack of 
knowledge concerning elk hunting rules and regulations. Defendant shall not be permitted to 
introduce any evidence as to what Defendant alleges was stated to him by any representative of 
Sportsman's Warehouse or by anyone with regard to hunting laws and regulations, including but 
not limited to the use of an elk "A" tag." 
On April 21, 2011, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss stating that the Criminal Complaint was 
insufficient. In response, the State filed a Motion to Amend on April 23, 2011. 
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On April 25, 2011, the Defendant filed an objection to the State's proposed jury instruction 
concerning IDAPA 13.0.08255 and a Motion to Reconsider Admissibility of Intent Evidence. 
The Defendant argued that the jury should not be instructed that IDAPA 13.0.08255 stands alone 
as the state of Idaho law without instructing them "that the Department of Fish and Game's 
IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, consistent with Idaho Code 36-105 (3)(c), 'shall 
be text of the [Department of Fish and Game's] proclamation to hunters." The Defendant also 
argued that "pursuant to the same statute, the magistrate court and the jury 'shall' take judicial 
notice of the 'proclamation, pamphlet, or brochure. '" The Defendant's argument for his Motion 
to Reconsider requested the magistrate court to reconsider the Order on the admissibility of 
intent evidence in light of the United States Supreme Court case Staples v. United States, 511 
U.S. 600 (1994). 
The State filed a 2nd Motion in Limine on April 25, 2011. The State requested a ruling by the 
magistrate court that the Defendant be precluded from calling any witnesses or introducing any 
exhibits at trial. The State also argued that the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 
"should be precluded on the ground that it presents a legal issue for the Court and not the jury." 
On April 25, 2011, the magistrate court issued its "Order" on the various motions filed by the 
State and Defendant. The court noted that it previously "ruled that intent was irrelevant based 
upon the case law presented and its belief that mistake of law is not a defense to a general intent 
crime." Emphasis added. The court further states that "this is a regulatory issue and the 
difference between malum in se and malum prohibitum crimes is applicable in the case. 
Regulatory crimes generally do not require any specific intent other than to do the act 
complained of." The court found the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was not well founded 
based upon the Amended Complaint and the reasons for not allowing it. Finally, the magistrate 
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court addressed what it deemed to be applicable law in the case. Specifically, the court 
addressed the Defendant's argument that there was not sufficient notice. The court found that it 
could not "find sufficient incongruence between the regulations and the publication to invalidate 
the charges pending herein." It concluded that as the question of the applicability of the law is a 
question for the court, "in this case the Court finds little difference between the IDAPA 
regulations and that described in the publication. The IDAP A regulations being the actual 
regulation it is that which should be given to the jury. How that law applies to the facts of the 
case is the province of the jury." 
On May 11, 2011, Defendant filed two motions and argued that the magistrate court lacked 
personal, territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case because "Rex Rammell is 
outside the de facto jurisdiction with proper standing in the de jure state of Idaho." The motions 
were heard and denied on May 25, 2011. 
On May 31, 2011, Defendant filed an Objection to jury instructions and a Motion to Reconsider. 
Defendant argued that he should be allowed to present his theory to the jury that he lacked the 
criminal intent or criminal negligence as required by law to be found guilty of the charged crime. 
The magistrate court issued its Order on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider on July 1,2011. The 
magistrate court upheld its previous ruling on the intent issues, explaining again that case law 
clearly establishes that the crime that Defendant was charged with is a general intent crime, 
which does not require proof of criminal intent or criminal negligence. A jury trial was held 
on June 30, 2011, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant filed a notice of appeal on 
July 1,2011. The matter came before the District Court on January 23,2012. The District Court 
affirmed the Magistrate Court's Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law on February 29, 2012. 
A Notice of Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was filed on March 15,2012. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Page 5 
Statement of Facts 
November 30, 2010, appellant successfully hunted and killed a cow elk on the last day of the 
season in the Tex Creek Zone east ofIdaho Falls. Previouslv he had unsuccessfullv hunted the 
"' "' 
back country of the Middle Fork Zone north of Yellow Pine. Unknown to the appellant, the 
Idaho Department ofFish and Game had made a rule change in 1999 allowing only one zone to 
be selected and hunted per year for elk. This was unknown to the appellant due to a decade's 
absence from elk hunting and because "nowhere" in the Big Game Rules section of the "IDAHO 
BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" was the zone limitation mentioned, let alone stated l . See 
IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, Big Game Rules, P. 64 72, Defendant's Exhibit 
A; marked, but not admitted. Prior to the rule change for decades elk hunters had been allowed 
to hunt in any area of the state as long as a season was open. This is still the method of general 
hunting for all species except elk. See IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, Seasons, 
Deer p. 8-26, Black Bear p. 56-60, and Mountain Lion p. 61-63. 
Mr. Rammell believing he had legally taken a cow elk proceeded to his truck while dragging his 
elk behind his snow machine. Holding a valid license and a punched and validated elk tag he 
respectfully stopped at a game check station on the road. See Trial transcript p. 47 line 8-22. 
To his great surprise the officer announced that the tag was not valid in that zone. Mr. Rammell 
asked the officer ifhe would show him the rule in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 
2010 brochure, which limited hunters to only one zone. See Trial transcript p. 51 line 11 18. 
The officer thumbed through the brochure and stated he could not find it, but assured Mr. 
Rammell it was the rule. 
1. The Big Game Rules p. 64 -72 of the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010, makes no mention of the 
IDAPA rule. The only place an ambiguous statement can be found is in the seldom read general comments section. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Page 6 
Trial tr. p. 54 line 18 - 22. 
Q (By Mr. Rammell) When I asked you if you could show me in the rule book where it 
says it was illegal to hunt in more than one zone, all you did is show me the zones; is that 
correct? 
A (By Officer Kelsey) That's correct. 
After a confrontation over confiscation of the elk and a false report to his superior officer, which 
claimed Rammell threatened to kill him if he took the elk, two Fish and Game officers, two 
deputy sheriffs, and two state policemen showed up at Mr. Rammell' s home, took possession of 
the elk, and issued him a citation. 
Idaho Law 
IC§18-114: UNION OF ACT AND INTENT. In every crime or public offense there must 
exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, !!.!. criminal negligence. Emphasis added. 
History: [18-114, added 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 848.] 
IC§18-115: MANIFESTATION OF INTENT. Intent or intention IS manifested by the 
commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense. Emphasis 
added. 
History: [I.e., sec. 18-115, as added by 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 848; am. 1994, ch. 131, sec. 1, 
p.296.] 
IC§18-201: PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: 
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an ignorance or 
mistake o[[act, which disproves any criminal intent. 
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof. 
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3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortune or 
by accident. when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence. Emphasis added. 
History: [I.C., sec. 18-201, as added by 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 849.] 
IC§18-11l. FELONY, MISDEMEANOR AND INFRACTION DEFINED. A felony is a 
crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. An infraction is a 
civil public offense, not constituting a crime, which is punishable only by a penalty not 
exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) and for which no period of incarceration may be imposed. 
Every other crime is a misdemeanor. .. 
History: [18-111, added 1972, ch. 336, sec. 1, p. 848; am. 1982, ch. 353, sec. 6, p. 878.] 
IC § 36-105 (3)(c). The proclamation shall be published in a pamphlet or brochure as provided 
in section 59-1012, Idaho Code, and distributed without charge to the public. The text ofthe 
proclamation published in a pamphlet or brochure shall be the official text of the proclamation. 
Judicial notice shall be taken of the proclamation pamphlet or brochure. 
II. 
ISSUES OF APPEAL 
A. Whether the doctrine of general intent and mala prohibitum crimes is contrary to Idaho 
Codes § 18-114, §18-115, and §18-201. 
B. Whether the Idaho State Supreme Court in State v. Simpson, State v. Wimer and State v. 
Keller was in error. \Vhether Idaho Code §36-502(b) as interpreted by the Courts to mean the 
element of intent [mens rea] is not required is correct or whether the element of intent [mens rea] 
or criminal negligence as required by Idaho Code § 18-114 and clarified in Idaho Code § 18-115 
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and Idaho Code § 18-201 in "every" crime is implied in accordance with Staples v. The United 
States (1994). 
C. Whether the lower court committed plain error by failing to require the element of 
criminal negligence as an alternative in the jury instructions as required by Idaho Code § 18-114. 
D. Whether the lower court committed plain error by failing to allow the defendant his right 
to present his theory of defense, based on Idaho codes § 18-114, § 18-115, and § 18-201, in 
violation of his due process rights. Whether the Defendant's theory of his case, evidenced as a 
matter of law, was or was not presented to the jury under proper instruction. Whether the Order 
granting the State's Motion in Limine violated the Defendant's right to due process of law by 
suppressing evidence. 
E. Whether the lower court committed plain error by precluding from evidence the "IDAHO 
BIG GAME Season and Rules 2010" brochure, while allowing the Plaintiff to admit his marked 
sections. 
F. Whether it was error to deny the Defendant the opportunity to present his defense of 
mistake of fact, which disproves criminal intent or criminal negligence based on detrimental 
reliance upon the publication "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010", a brochure which 
is the State's "official text" of the hunting rules. Whether the limited questioning allowed by the 
Court in cross examination of the State's witness as to the brochure "IDAHO BIG GAME 
Seasons and Rules 2010" was a denial of Defendant's Constitutional due process right to 
confront witnesses against him. Whether the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" 
brochure was material evidence as to Defendant's intent and exhibited a failure of the Idaho Fish 
and Game to properly notify hunters of rule changes. Whether or not, the brochure's exclusion 
from evidence was a denial of defendant's due process rights. 
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G. Whether the lower court committed plain error when it failed to dismiss based on a lack 
of personal, territorial, and/or subject matter jurisdiction. 
III. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"On the question of whether evidence is relevant, this Court reviews the trial court's ruling de 
novo." State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P. 2d 596, 602 (1993). State v. Robinett, 
141 Idaho 110,112, 106 P.3d 436,438 (2005). "[T]he determination as to whether constitutional 
requirements have been satisfied is freely reviewed." State v. Lewis, 144 Idaho 64, 66, 156 P.3d 
565, 567 (2007). 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUES A, B, C. 
A. Whether the doctrine of general intent and mala prohibitum crimes is contrary to 
Idaho Codes § 18-114, § 18-115, and § 18-201. 
B. Whether the Idaho State Supreme Court in State v. Simpson, 137 Idaho 813, 817, 54 
P.3d 456, 460 (Ct. App. 2002), State v. Wimer, 118 Idaho 732, 800 P.2d 128 (Ct App. 1990) 
and State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051, (1902) was in error. Whether Idaho Code 
§ 36-502(b) as interpreted by the Courts to mean the element of intent [mens rea] is not 
required is correct or whether the element of intent [mens rea] or criminal negligence as 
required by Idaho Code § 18-114 and clarified in Idaho Code § 18-115 and Idaho Code § 
18-201 in "every" crime is implied in accordance with Staples v. The United States (1994). 
C. Whether the lower court committed plain error by failing to require the element of 
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criminal negligence as an alternative in the jury instructions as required by Idaho Code 
§ 18-114. 
The "Order" precluded the Defendant from presenting evidence as to his lack of [criminal] intent 
or criminal negligence "with regard to hunting laws and regulations," contrary to Idaho Law: see 
Order Re: State's Motion in Limine, VoLl 43. Idaho law requires a union or joint operation of 
act and [criminal] intent or criminal negligence in "every" crime. The lower Court made an error 
by not requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the element of [criminal] intent or 
criminal negligence in order to prove a violation of law. 
IC § 18-114: UNION OF ACT AND INTENT. In "every" crime or public offense there must 
exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, Q! criminal negligence. Emphasis added. 
IC § 18-115: MANIFESTATION OF INTENT. Intent or intention is manifested by the 
commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense. Emphasis 
added. 
IC § 18-201: PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. All persons are capable 
of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: 
1. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under an ignorance or 
mistake o[[act, which disproves any criminal intent. 
2. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof 
3. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortune or 
by accident, when it appears that there was not evil design, intention or culpable 
negligence. Emphasis added. 
IC lS-114's "intent", taken in conjunction with IC lS-115 and IC IS-201, clearly means criminal 
or evil intent, the "mens rea" or guilty mind element of "every" crime. When interpreting a 
statute, the appellate court strives to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent for its 
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enactment. 
Wheeler v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 263m 207 P.3d 988, 994 (2009). 
"When interpreting a statute, this Court must strive to give force and effect to the legislature's 
intent in passing the statute." Davaz v. Priest River Glass Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 333, 336, 870 
P.2d 1292, 1295 (1994). "It must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole." 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813,135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006) 
(citations omitted). "Where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, this Court 
must give effect to the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." State v. 
Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685,688 (1999). However, if the result is "palpably 
absurd," this Court must engage in statutory construction. Id. When engaging in statutory 
construction, this Court has a "duty to ascertain the legislative intent, and give effect to that 
intent." Id. "[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of 
applicable statutes together to determine tlte intent oUlte legislature." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 
336,870 P.2d at 1295 (internal citation omitted). "[The Court] also must take account of all 
other matters such as the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the 
statute." Id. Emphasis added. 
The Appellant/defendant claimed he was improperly notified that his tag was limited to only one 
zone in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, the Idaho State Fish and 
Game's "official text," creating a defense of "ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves any 
criminal intent" or "criminal negligence." See Defendant's Objection to Plaintiffs Motion in 
Limine and Motion to Dismiss, VoLl -50, and Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 5-18-2011, 
VoLl -122. The Motions to Dismiss and Reconsider were erroneously denied. See Court's 
Order on Motions, VoLl -63, and Court's Order on Motion to Reconsider, VoLl -163. 
Curiously, the "Order" was reconsidered with no explanation why the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Staples v. United States, (92-1441), 511 U.S. 600 (1994), had no bearing on the 
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case. Staples, is applicable to the case through the due process clause of the 5th and 14th 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. According to Staples, "silence on this point 
[intent] by itself does not necessarily suggest that Congress intended to dispense with a 
conventional mens rea element, which would require that the defendant know the facts that make 
his conduct illegal." See Defendant's Objection To Instructing The Jury That Idaho's 
Administrative Rule Stands Alone as the State of Idaho Law and Motion to Reconsider 
Admissibility ofIntent Evidence, VoU -74. 
The Court made an error by incorrectly instructing the jury in regards to the element of 
"intent" . 
Final Jury Instruction No. 14. See VoU -172 
"In every crime or public offense, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent. 
The word "intent" does not mean an intent to commit a crime, but merely the intent to knowingly 
perform the interdicted act." 
Note: The first sentence is verbatim ofIe 18-114, minus "or criminal negligence." 
This jury instruction is so confusing it effectively eliminated the elements of [criminal] intent 
and criminal negligence, contrary to Idaho Law. It distorts the true meaning of intent [criminal) 
and doesn't even include criminal negligence. Furthermore, how can a person "knowingly 
perform the interdicted (prohibited) act" without having "an intent to commit a crime," unless a 
mistake is made? It is not possible! The Idaho legislature clarifies the answer to this question in 
the following law. It is repeated for convenience and emphasis. 
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IC 18-201: PERSONS CAPABLE OF COMMITTING CRIMES. All persons are capable of 
committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes: 
4. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, under all ignorance 
or mistake offact, which disproves any criminal intent. 
5. Persons who committed the act charged without being conscious thereof. 
6. Persons who committed the act or made the omission charged, through misfortul1e or 
by accident, whel1 it appears that there was not evil design. intention or culpable 
negligence. Emphasis added. 
The State argued in its Motion in Limine, VoLl -36, p. 1, that "All the State need prove is that 
defendant was found in possession of an illegally obtained elk. Defendant's mens rea is not an 
issue in this case." This argument relies upon State v. Simpson, 2002, who relies on State v. 
Wimer, 1990, and State v. Keller, 8 Idaho 699, 70 Pac. 1051 (1902) as supporting cases. In 
Simpson, Keller is quoted from 1902: 
"Wicked or willful intent to violate the criminal law is not an essential ingredient in every 
criminal offense." (maybe it wasn't in 1902) "And that is so in statutory offenses when the 
statute does not make the intent with which an act is done an ingredient of the crime. The rule is 
that in acts mala in se the intent governs, and in acts mala prohibita, the intent does not govern, 
and the only inquiry is, 'Has the law been violated?'" Comment in parentheses added. 
Note: Idaho Codes 18-111, 18-114, 18-115, and 18-201 were added in "1972" to correct 
the law. However, the courts have continued to use Keller, (1902), for case law precedent. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Page 14 
Magistrate Clark stated, "This is a regulatory issue and difference between malum in se and 
malum prohibitum crimes is applicable in this case. Regulatory crimes generally do not require 
any specific intent other than to do the act complained of." See Court's Order on Motions, VoU 
-63, page 2. The State argued and the lower court concurred that "The crime charged is a general 
intent crime and does not require any specific intent." See State's Motion in Limine. In other 
words, that Idaho code 36-502(b) is a mala prohibita act because there is no "specific intent" 
wording, therefore, intent does not govern. In an attempt to align so called mala prohibita acts in 
statutes, which do not legally exist, with the mandate set forth in Idaho Code 18-114, that in 
"every" crime there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence, 
the tenn "general intent crime" had been created. Ironically, "general intent" means no intent at 
all or mala prohibita. The State in an attempt to justify the removal of the element of [criminal] 
intent or criminal negligence of "every" crime stated, "Basically, all that is required is the 
'intent' to do the act." See State's Motion in Limine, p. 1. This reasoning is a perversion of 
Idaho Law that apparently dates back to Keller in 1902. It certainly is contrary to IC 18-114 
(1972), unconstitutionally denies due process, and sets the stage for easy convictions. For this 
reason Appellant appeals this case to Idaho's highest court. 
Magistrate Clark went further stating, "The Court had ruled that intent was irrelevant based upon 
the case law presented and its belief that mistake of law is not a defense to a general intent 
crime." See Court's Order on Motions, p.2. To the contrary, the Court then included ajury 
instruction requiring a union of act and intent, but stated, "The word 'intent' does not mean an 
intent to commit a crime." This language was used intentionally to so confuse the jury that there 
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was no means by which they could understand the jury instruction or have any hope of following 
the law according to IC 18-114,18-11 18-210. This begs the question, "Why did the magistrate 
include a jury instruction on intent after ruling to preclude it from evidence and argument, if 
intent was not an element ofthe case? The Appellant believes the instruction was given to try to 
meet the mandate found in IC 18-114. The Appellant believes the magistrate was so perplexed 
by the situation, which is what happens when case law contradicts Idaho statutes, that in his 
attempt to weave unweavable case law with Idaho statutes, he only further confused the process. 
Appellant believes this is why the magistrate asked repeatedly that the Defendant plead guilty 
and appeal the case, stating that he "tended to agree" on many of the arguments, but was 
constrained by case law. The Appellant also believes the magistrate's conscience was revealed 
by his actions following sentencing to partially stay the sentence, then in a hearing on December 
1, 2011 to stay the entire sentence based upon the results of the appeal. 
Furthermore, "mistake of law" and "mistake of fact" are not the same. As argued by the State, a 
general intent crime is a mala prohibita act according to the magistrate and case law. However, a 
mala prohibita act cannot be a crime, because it lacks the required elements of [criminal] intent 
or criminal negligence. Therefore, "mistake of fact" is a defense to this crime, because it 
disproves [criminal] intent or criminal negligence. 
There are many problems with both the State's arguments and the Court's rulings. 
1. Possession of Unlawfully Taken Wildlife is a statute predicated upon a regulation. Judge 
Clark was partially correct in stating, "Regulatory crimes generally do not require any 
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specific intent other than the act complained of." The part that is incorrect is that 
regulatory violations are infractions, not crimes, if all they require is the act. 
Ie 18-111. FELONY, MISDEMEANOR AND INFRACTION DEFINED. A felony is 
a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. An 
infraction is a civil public offense, not constituting a crime, which is punishable only by a 
penalty not exceeding one hundred dollars ($100) and for which no period of 
incarceration may be imposed. Every other crime is a misdemeanor ... 
Was the tag used by the defendant invalid? Yes; IDAPA is clear on this matter, even 
though the defendant argues the "official text" of the proclamation is not. Could the 
defendant be charged with a regulatory infraction without the State having to prove his 
intent? Theoretically, yes. However, the fines could not exceed $100.00, nor could there 
be any jail time. See IC 18-111. The problem here is that, if anything, an infraction 
occurred, but the Idaho Fish and Game and the prosecution elevated it to a misdemeanor 
to assist in the vindictive prosecution of the Defendant and past Defendants who have 
violated their rules. The State and Court errors in removing the [criminal] intent or 
criminal negligence element requirement of the statute! Did the defendant criminally 
intend to possess an elk unlawfully? No; no such intent was shown by the State as 
required by law. Or was the defendant criminally negligent for not knowing that his tag 
was invalid? No; because the official Idaho State brochure was not clear that the 
defendant's tag was not valid in another zone. This burden justly should have rested on 
the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the [criminal] intent or criminal negligence 
ofthe defendant in accordance with IC 18-114, 18-115, 18-201, and 18-111, which 
allows for criminal punishment to include larger fines and jail time. The fact that the 
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State chose not to enter such proof, demonstrates that no such evidence existed. If the 
Idaho Fish and Game and other agencies had to prove criminal intent or criminal 
negligence in order or to convict persons of crimes, most of their cases would never make 
it to trial and very few would ever be appealed. 
2. General intent or the intent merely to commit an act as argued by the State is not the same 
as criminal or evil intent to commit an act as required by law to commit a crime. IC 18-
114 in conjunction with 18-115 and 18-201 makes this clear. The [criminal] intent or 
criminal negligence element of "every" crime, including the misdemeanor defendant was 
charged with, must be proven. The act of shooting an elk out of one zone and placing 
upon it a tag issued for use in another zone, when previously this was allowed, is not 
enough when the State changed the law, but failed to clearly inform the public of the law 
change in its "official" brochure. It is time the Court clears this up. There is only one 
type of intent if Wheeler is used and that is criminal intent! 
The Court's opinion in Wheeler bears repeating: 
"[T]he Court must construe a statute as a whole, and consider all sections of applicable 
statutes together to determine the intent of the legislature. Davaz 125 Idaho at 336,870 
P.2d at 1295. "[The Court] also must take account of all other matters such as the 
reasonableness of the proposed interpretations and the policy behind the statute." 
The legislature makes no distinction between general and specific intent, only the courts. 
Furthermore, just because a statute omits specific intent language does not mean the 
element of criminal intent or criminal negligence is removed as required by I C 18-114 
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and as stated in Staples. Idaho Code was perverted by the court in Keller and agencies 
and prosecutors have taken advantage ever since. 
3. Idaho Code does offer an alternative to the requirement of criminal intent; criminal 
negligence. Should the defendant have known that his tag was invalid in the Tex Creek 
zone? Of course to answer this question, the defendant should have been permitted to 
present evidence of the failure of the Idaho Fish and Game to properly notify hunters of 
the rule change, which limits hunters to one zone only. To do this the IDAHO BIG 
GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, the "official text" of the proclamation, should 
have been admitted into evidence and argued so that the jury could have decided the 
question of fact, whether the defendant was misled by the State or whether he had 
criminal intent or criminal negligence. 
4. One cannot unlawfully (criminally) possess wildlife unless one criminally intends to do 
so. This is foundational law throughout America. If I pick someone else's coat up after a 
party, having mistaken it as my own, I cannot be charged with theft, because for an act to 
be criminal there must also exist criminal intent, i.e., intent to permanently deprive 
unlawfully. The act alone is not enough! Dick Cheney was not criminally prosecuted for 
aggravated battery when he mistakenly shot his friend while hunting. Shooting another 
person does not become a crime simply by the act. It becomes a crime when a person 
criminally intends to do so. In this case, it is not a crime to possess an elk, even one 
taken with an invalid tag, unless one criminally intended to do so. It may be against a 
regulation and an infraction (no requirement of intent), but the act alone does not make it 
a crime. If a person is prosecuted simply for doing a minor act that is contrary to a rule, it 
should properly be termed an infraction with a penalty of less than $100 dollars. 
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However, when a person is charged with a crime, a misdemeanor in this case, which 
carries substantial fines and jail time, the requirement for the State to prove not only that 
an unlawful act was committed, but also that criminal intent or a guilty mind or criminal 
negligence must also be proven in order to comply with due process requirements. For 
the court to have viewed this as a regulatory crime, like a speeding ticket, which 
according to the court removes the element of criminal intent, is unjust, unfair and 
prejudicial to Defendant's due process rights because the court asked the jury to convict 
the defendant of a statutory crime with statutory penalties. It was not fair to the jury or 
the defendant. The burden of proof should have been equal to the charge. It was an error 
by the Court to lower the burden of proof for the State as if it were a speeding ticket, and 
then punish the defendant with a misdemeanor with statutory penalties. Either the State's 
burden of proof (must prove criminal intent or criminal negligence) should have been 
equal to the statutory punishment ($1500 fine, plus the loss of the elk $1000, a 2 year 
suspension of hunting license, and five days jail time, in addition to the damage to the 
defendant's reputation, time, and trouble defending himself) or the defendant's 
punishment should have been equal to the State's low level of burden of proof (e.g., less 
than $100 for infractions and no jailor loss oflicense). 
ARGUMENT OF ISSUE D. 
D. The Defendant's theory of the case, evidenced as a matter of law, was not presented to 
the jury under proper instruction. 
"A defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his or her theory of the case submitted to the 
jury under proper instructions." State of Idaho v. Eastman, 122 Idaho 87, 90, 831 P.2d 555, 558 
(1992). 
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In discussing a trial courts obligations the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following: 
"If the theory is not supported by the evidence, then the court must reject the instruction. But if 
the theory is supported by the evidence, then the court must determine if the instruction is a 
correct statement of law. If it is a correct statement, then the instruction should be given. But if 
the instruction is incorrect, then the trial court is under the affirmative duty to properly instruct 
the jury. In this manner, the defendant is still under the obligation to bring forth his or her theory 
or theories to the attention of the court. The trial court is not obligated to determine on its own 
upon what theory or theories to instruct the jury on. It is the petitioners request to be heard 
according to his theory or theories according to the laws o(the state. " Emphasis added. 
Appellant/defendant's theories are that the he lacked either the [criminal] intent or the criminal 
negligence required by law, IC. 18-114, 18-115, 18-201, to unlawfully possess wildlife and that 
the wording in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, which hunters in 
Idaho rely on explicitly as the "official text" for explanations of the "details" of the laws and 
rules of the Idaho Fish and Game, is not consistent with the language codified in IDAP A, leading 
to "ignorance or mistake of fact, which disproves criminal intent" or "criminal negligence." 
The evidence required by Eastman is a matter of law and is incontrovertible. \Vhat evidence 
does the defendant's theories rely upon? Idaho Law! Appellant/defendant argues just because 
the word intent is not explicitly stated in IC 36-502(b), does not mean it is not an implied 
element as per Staples. In fact it must be! Furthermore, the words "taken or killed unlawfully" 
surely imply evil or criminal intent! Idaho codes 36-502(b) taken together with 18-114, 18-115, 
and 18-201, is clear; criminal (evil) intent or criminal negligence is a required element to 
possess wildlife unlawfully taken. 
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IDAHO CODE 18-115 MANIFESTATION OF INTENT. Intent or intention is manifested by 
the commission of the acts and surrounding circumstances connected with the offense. 
The Court has ruled that the intent element of 36-502(b), is fulfilled simply by the act of 
possession. This statute makes it clear that the surrounding circumstances, (ambiguity and 
vagueness created in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure), in addition to 
"the commission of the acts" are required to determine "manifestations of intent," leading to 
ignorance and a mistake of fact as a legal defense to the charges. What were the surrounding 
circumstances? Defendant was precluded from presenting any evidence for his defense to be 
considered by the jury. 
The following final jury instructions were in error as argued in Defendant's Objection's To Jury 
Instructions, prior to closing arguments. 
Final Jury Instruction #10. 
"In order for an animal to be unlawfully taken, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the following: 
1. That the animal was a game animal protected under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
2. That the animal was taken or killed in a manner in violation of the regulations or laws 
of the State ofIdaho. 
3. That an elk is a game animal protected under the laws of the State ofIdaho. 
The defendant requested the following language be inserted in the instruction, but was 
denied in error: 
"In order for an animal to be unlawfully taken, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
the following: 
"That the animal was taken or killed in a manner in violation of the regulation or laws of the 
State ofIdaho as detailed in the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure. 
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Final Jury Instruction #13. 
"In order for an elk to be lawfully taken or killed, the following must be complied with:" 
ELK ZONE A AND B TAGS 
1. Elk Zone A Tag. The Elk Zone A Tag is valid for specified A Tag elk seasons 
within a specified elk zone only. 
2. Elk Zone B Tag. The Elk Zone B Tag is valid for specified B Tag elk seasons 
within a specified elk zone only. 
The Court was in error by only putting into the final jury instructions the above IDAP A when 
contrary information was contained in the brochure delivered by the Department to the general 
public, of which Defendant is one. Having the conflicted public material works an estoppel 
against the State. Where two conflicting or unclear statements of the laws are published by the 
State, the public is not required to determine which is a correct statement and which is not. 
Hunters are not required to rely on IDAP A as the "official text" when they are given as an 
"official text" a publication from the State which provides contrary or unclear explanations of the 
law. The Court insisted on showing the jury IDAP A. It, therefore, should have put all of the 
other applicable laws into jury instructions, so as to not prejudice the defendant; namely IC 18-
114, 18-115, 18-201, and 36-502(b) as well as the information found in the "IDAHO BIG 
GAME Seasons and Rules 201 0" brochure, which clearly creates a conflict in the information 
provided about the law to the public by the State. It is a violation of due process for the state to 
fail to clearly notify the public in its "official" hunting brochure as to the IDAP A law, if it 
expects the public to follow the same. 
Final Jury instruction #12 
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"When the evidence shows that a person voluntarily did that which the law declares to be a 
crime, it is no defense that the person did not know that the act was unlawful or that the person 
believed it to be lawful." 
Unless a person has criminal intent, a person cannot be held to a crime, unless they are guilty of 
criminal negligence! It is a defense according to Ie 18-201 that a person "did not know that the 
act was unlawful or that the person believed it to be lawful." Therefore, the instruction was 
erroneous and an incorrect statement of the law on its face. Furthennore, the word "voluntarily" 
obscures the requirement of criminal intent or criminal negligence, although it implies it; which 
means the instruction was confusing to the jury as a matter of law and denied Defendant due 
process. 
ARGUMENT OF ISSUES E. AND F. 
E.. Whether the lower court committed plain error by precluding from evidence the 
IDAHO BIG GAME Season and Rules 2010 brochure, while allowing the Plaintiffto admit 
his marked sections. 
F. Whether it was error to deny the Defendant the opportunity to present his defense 
of mistake of fact, which disproves criminal intent or criminal negligence based on 
detrimental reliance upon the publication "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010", 
a brochure which is the State's "official text" of the hunting rules. Whether the limited 
questioning allowed by the Court in cross examination of the State's witness as to the 
brochure "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" was a denial of Defendant's 
Constitutional due process right to confront witnesses against him. Whether the "IDAHO 
BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure was material evidence as to Defendant's 
intent and exhibited a failure of the Idaho Fish and Game to properly notify hunters of rule 
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changes. Whether or not, the brochure's exclusion from evidence was a denial of 
defendant's due process rights. 
The IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure, the "official text", was allowed only 
limited questioning in cross examination, see Trial transcript, and was precluded by "Order" in 
Defendant's direct examination, suppressing evidence. The law requires the Idaho Fish and 
Game to publish in a free brochure, a proclamation of the "official text", distributed to the 
public, in order for the public to understand the rules and regulations. 
Ie 36-105(c). 
(c) The proclamation shall be published in a pamphlet or brochure as provided in 
section 59-1012, Idaho Code, and distributed without charge to the public. The text 
of the proclamation published in a pamphlet or brochure shall be the official text of 
the proclamation. Judicial notice shall be taken of the proclamation pamphlet or 
brochure. Emphasis added. 
The Court was in error by failing to take judicial notice of the brochure and allowing it to be 
admitted as evidence. See Trial Tr p. 42, In 17 thru p. 43, In 25. Further, it was in error by 
stating "it does not seem as if the publication adds anything to assist the jury in deciding this 
case." See the Court's Order on Motion to Reconsider, p. 5. Whether the proclamation adds 
anything to assist the jury in deciding the case or not was not the judge's decision to make as it 
was a part of Defendant's theory of the case and the brochure existed, and was a fact that the jury 
was entitled to consider as a matter oflaw. It is the "official text" of the Big Game hunting rules 
and should have been allowed into evidence. Because it was not allowed into evidence the jury 
was misinformed as to the facts and circumstances that surrounded Defendant's alleged 
violation. To preclude the "brochure" from full examination and evidence was to disregard it as 
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the "official text", which is exactly what the magistrate did. Magistrate Clark made an error 
when he ruled it was a matter of law whether or not the brochure properly notified the defendant 
of the rule change. It is a matter oflaw whether the Idaho Fish and Game were required to 
properly notify hunters of the rule change in an "official text" of the proclamation. It is a matter 
of fact whether they did or not! The jury should have made this determination, not the judge. 
The defendant argued vehemently that the brochure failed to properly notify hunters of the 1999 
rule change, which made it illegal to hunt in more than one zone. The defendant made the 
following argument to the Magistrate, but still was denied the right to have the "brochure" 
entered into evidence. See VoLl -122, Objections to Jury Instructions and Brief in support of 
Motion to Reconsider. 
"The words in IDAP A are not the same as the words in the brochure." 
IDAP A 13.01.08.255.01 
01. Elk Zone A Tag. The Elk Zone A Tag is valid for specified A Tag elk 
seasons within a specified elk zone only. (7-1-99) 
IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010 brochure 
"Elk Hunting in Idaho is managed in 29 elk zones. In addition, Fish and Game has 
established a 2-tag system as an effort to offer elk hunters the most general season 
choices. Hunters may select 1 zone and choose either an "A tag" or a "B tag" in most elk 
zones." 
Note: This paragraph is not found in the Big Game Rules section. It is found in a general 
section, which is seldom read by experienced hunters. 
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The language in IDAP A states that tags are valid in "specified" elk zones. But note the lack of 
the word "only" and the emphasis on a "2-tag system" in the IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and 
Rules 2010 "in most elk zones." The words "may select" and "in most elk zones" prefaced by "a 
2-tag system" and not a "1 zone, 2-tag system", opens the door for "ignorance and mistake of 
fact" by hunters, especially in light of the fact that the rule was changed in 1999. The State 
should be estopped from prosecuting this violation as a crime, when the State creates an 
inconsistency in the "official" public advisory about the law; which advisory is intended by the 
State of Idaho to inform members of the public how they can comply with the law. The lack of 
fairness is overwhelming. 
Furthermore, Page 3 of the "IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure, fourth 
paragraph from the bottom, states the following words: 
"Detailed" big game hunting rules and restrictions begin on page 64. License requirements and 
fees begin on page 92." 
Most if not all hunters who want to refresh their memories or learn the rules for the first time will 
then tum to page 64, where the hunter is not prompted to go to any other source, such as the 
internet, for more details on the rules. There hunters will find no rules or restrictions about 
hunting in more than one zone or any mention of "A" and "B" tags. This is exactly what the 
defendant did, since it had been awhile, eleven years, since he had hunted elk. Once a hunter 
reads the rules, he then turns to the species section he wants to hunt. Page 1 of the elk section is 
for new elk hunters. In other words hunters who have never hunted in Idaho or who don't know 
the difference between a spike and a branched antler bull. Put another way, not the place you 
would expect to find the only mention of the zone and tag restrictions, as ambiguous as it is. 
Most seasoned elk hunters do not even look at the first page. They know what a spike is! They 
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go to the zone pages to try and figure out when and where they want to hunt. That in itself is an 
arduous task. Please see the "brochure" to affirm this point. To add to the confusion of the zone 
A and B tag system, some zones have quotas. One may ask: Why does the Fish and Game put 
quotas on general season hunts? Limits on tags in specific areas are typically put in the 
controlled hunt section. The Magistrate stated the brochure would only "confuse" the jury. This 
is the very point raised by Defendant, i.e., this is what confused the Defendant. And this is the 
very reason why the brochure needed to be admitted as evidence in support of defendant's theory 
of defense. 
It is deceptive when the brochure uses the word "detailed", on page 3, to describe the section on 
rule to then expect any further analysis. Hunters are not expected to be lmvyers in order to 
lawfully engage in this sport. How can a hunter be expected to obey the law when the law itself 
is unclear and confusing? Or better yet, how can a hunter be expected to obey the law when the 
law that the prosecution seeks to enforce cannot even be found in the "detailed" Big Game Rules 
section? Where is the due process of "notice?" Thus, the Defendant was not put on "notice" of 
the law change and the difference in the amended law, and without notice the Defendant was 
denied due process as to the application of this statute to him in this situation as a matter of law. 
The State cannot expect the public to go any further than to rely on the information in the rules 
section of the "official text" to learn the law! Especially, if going further means that the public 
must compare, contrast and make refined distinctions that only those trained in the law can 
make. In computer parlance it would be said that these contrasting laws are not "user friendly." If 
the word "general" replaced the word "detailed" on page 3, then hunters might be held to higher 
standard of further investigation and knowing more about the law, but it didn't, which means 
there was no notice of the distinction. The fact is the law, Ie. 36-105(c), requires the Idaho Fish 
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and Game to "publish" their "proclamation" of new rules "in a pamphlet or brochure as provided 
in section 59-1012, Idaho Code, and distributed without charge to the public" means that 
members of the public, including Defendant have a legal right to rely upon said brochure. The 
"IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" is the "official text of the rules" of Idaho Fish 
and Game law. The Defendant, who is a member of the public, has a right to rely upon such 
"official" publication and cannot be held criminally responsible for having done so. To hold 
Defendant liable when he followed one version of the law is a "Catch 22." To deny him the 
opportunity to present this information to the jury in cross examination of the State's witnesses, 
and exclude this evidence from Defendant's case in chief, and fail to permit the brochure to go to 
the jury as evidence and deny the Defendant the opportunity to argue the effect of the brochure 
to the jury in closing and then deny Defendant the opportunity to have an instruction on his 
theory of the case quoting from said brochure was an absolute denial of fundamental 
constitutional due process of a fair trial. 
A hunter cannot be expected to rely on any information other than the "official text" the 
"IDAHO BIG GAME Seasons and Rules 2010" brochure. To preclude the brochure from 
evidence prejUdices the defendant's right to due process and the right to bring forth his theory of 
defense. Because the brochure was precluded from evidence, this case should be dismissed or, in 
the alternative, remanded for retrial to a new judge with an Order to allow the brochure into 
evidence and full argument of its text in support of the defendant's theory of defense. 
ARGUMENT OF ISSUE G. 
G. Whether the lower court committed plain error when it failed to dismiss based on a 
lack of personal, territorial, and/or subject matter jurisdiction. The Court lacked personal, 
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territorial, and subject matter jurisdiction and should have granted the Motion to Correct the 
Record and Dismiss the Case. See VoLl -101. 
Article 5, Section 1 of the Idaho State Constitution reads: 
FORMS OF ACTION ABOLISHED. 
1. The distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such 
actions and suits, are hereby prohibited; and there shall be in this state but one form 
of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the redress of private 
wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action; and every action prosecuted by 
the people ofthe state as a party, against a person charged with a public offense. 
(or the punishment ofthe same, shall be termed a criminal action. 
2. Feigned issues are prohibited, and the fact at issue shall be tried by order of court 
before a jury. Emphasis added. 
The Plaintiff, STATE OF IDAHO is a corporation; EIN# 82-60000852, 82-60000952. 
Defendant, "REX F. RAMMELL," is a false designation of an individual who does not exist as a 
person in the state ofIdaho. Rex Floyd Rammell, is the real party of interest and he has declared 
by a U.S. Constitution Ninth Amendment Proclamation that he is a freeholder in the American 
sense and is anomesident of "this state" (STATE OF IDAHO), see Defendant's Exhibit "c" 
attached to Defendant's Motion to Correct the Record. Rex Floyd Rammell, the real party of 
interest, entered a Motion to Correct the Record and Dismiss the case. The Court denied the 
Motion in error. An objection was properly and timely made and the issue properly preserved on 
appeal. 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Page 30 
Furthennore, by charging REX F. RAMMELL with a crime as a person who does not exist the 
State has brought a feigned issue (a criminal proceeding) before the Court, which is prohibited 
by Article 5, Section 1 of the Idaho State Constitution. Only "criminal actions" by "the people of 
the state as a party" may be brought against "a person charged with a public offense." Since 
REX F. RAMMELL is not a person within the meaning of the Idaho State Constitution, the real 
party of interest, Rex Floyd Rammell is not answerable to charges against such other individual. 
Therefore, the issue whether REX F. RAMMELL committed a crime in the STATE OF IDAHO 
was and is a feigned issue. Criminal "proceedings" by the STATE OF IDAHO, incorporated, 
under the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (not criminal actions by the "the people of the 
state as a party) are prohibited. 
Appellant requests this Honorable Court reverse the lower Court and Correct the Record and 
dismiss the matter in STATE OF IDAHO v. REX F. RAMMELL for lack of jurisdiction. If 
charges are to be brought forward they must come as a criminal action by the state of Idaho as a 
party, against a real person, who is a de jure citizen named Rex Floyd Rammell, in accordance 
with Article 5, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution and not against a fictitious person who does 
not exist, such as REX F. RAMMELL. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
In hindsight, it is clear to the Appellant that magistrate and district judges cannot (will not) rule 
contrary to case law, even if they would like to. It is also readily apparent that prior case law 
(1902) when made in error, ignorantly or maliciously, has a cascade effect on future cases. Now 
for over 100 years in this case and many before it. Legislative intent misapplied by the courts 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF Page 31 
changes the law and has vast consequences. It is only through the wisdom of sitting Supreme 
Court justices and solid arguments by appellants that error is evidenced and corrected. The 
ruling in this case will continue a distortion of the true intent of the legislature allowing agencies 
to severely punish citizens for minor mistakes or it will properly realign case law with statutory 
law affecting thousands of criminal indictments that were the consequence of ignorance or 
mistake of fact, which disproves any criminal intent. 
DATED THIS fl day of July, 2012. 
Rex Floyd Rammell 
VI. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Service hereof has been made upon all parties required to be served on this Uday of July, 
2012. I served two copies of this Brief by mail on the Attorney for Respondent at the address 
below. 
Kenneth K. Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorney General 
Statehouse Mail 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
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